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Quiet Professionals: The Future Role of 
U.S. Special Operations in Africa 
Matthew A. Stvan 
 
United States Special Operations Forces 
are beginning to take the lead in U.S. 
military operations in Africa, highlighting a 
new combat model for future U.S. 
campaigns. 
 
The United States Special Operations 
Command (USSOCOM) has taken a lead 
role in anti-terror operations since 9/11. 
Small teams of experienced and well-
trained operators have been found to be 
more adaptable in counter-insurgency 
efforts than conventional, line unit forces.205 
Over the course of the U.S. War on Terror, 
USSOCOM's leadership has established 
and continually refined an unofficial model 
of operations that is becoming widely 
adopted by the U.S. military during its 
involvement in Operations Enduring 
Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, and New Dawn. 
As these operations draw to a close, 
SOCOM’s operations model is likely to be 
applied to other theaters of conflict, 
including the continent of Africa.206 
  The continent of Africa has been 
increasingly utilized as a stronghold by 
Islamist terror groups in recent years, 
including al-Qaeda affiliated al-Shabbab in 
Somalia.207 Africa also accommodates 
groups accused of human rights violations. 
One such group is the Lord's Resistance 
Army (LRA), which operates in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the 
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Central African Republic (CAR), and South 
Sudan.208 Though not a priority in the past, 
the United States has begun to take a 
vested interest in the stability and security of 
the African continent, particularly since the 
attack on the American diplomatic mission 
at Benghazi, Libya on September 11, 
2012.209 
 Due to political and diplomatic 
concerns, U.S. intervention in Africa has 
mostly been limited to participation in UN 
peacekeeping missions.210 Special 
Operations Forces are  heavily utilized 
when direct action is  undertaken, usually in 
the form of JSOC (Joint Special Operations 
Command) raids on time-sensitive 
objectives considered to be in the American 
national interest; most recently, the rescue 
of Jessica Buchanan and Poul Hagen 
Thisted from Somalia during Operation 
Octave Fusion in January 2012.211 In more 
sustained conflicts, such as those occurring 
in the central African nations, the U.S. 
would not be able to intervene significantly 
without committing to full-scale operations 
with conventional forces. For this reason, 
SOCOM is likely to become a leading 
influence in future U.S. operations in Africa, 
as it has been in Afghanistan since 2001.212 
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 In previous conventional wars, 
special warfare units acted primarily in 
support of conventional troops. However, 
during operations in Afghanistan, special 
operations' unique capabilities became vital 
to U.S. military success in the conflict. 
Utilizing language and foreign training 
expertise, U.S. Army Special Forces trained 
and fought alongside Afghan National Army 
(ANA) soldiers. This strengthened the ability 
of the Afghan military to engage the Taliban 
without assistance from NATO's 
International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF).213 By providing the training and 
support necessary for the ANA to become 
independent, the U.S. has turned them into 
a force multiplier, allowing ISAF personnel 
to focus on specific objectives rather than 
providing regional security. Training and 
equipping the ANA also enables ISAF to 
leave Afghanistan with a more capable 
defense against the Taliban. This strategy 
of utilizing indigenous forces is already used 
against the LRA in Central Africa.214 
 On October 14, 2011, U.S. President 
Barack Obama ordered the deployment of 
approximately 100 U.S. Special Operations 
personnel to the LRA's area of operations in 
and near Uganda.215 According to unofficial 
reports, the personnel were part of the U.S. 
Army's 10th Special Forces Group out of 
Fort Carson, Colorado.216 The primary 
objective of the deployment was to support 
Ugandan and other regional forces working 
to kill or capture Joseph Kony, leader of the 
LRA.217 On the President's orders, the SOF 
personnel were to act as "military advisors" 
and were only to engage the LRA in self-
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defense.218 The U.S. also supplied logistics 
and intelligence support to regional forces 
opposing the LRA. This limited role prevents 
additional combat deployments in the wake 
of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, while 
still enabling the U.S. to influence the 
outcome of the conflict.  
 U.S. Special Operations roles are 
not limited to advising and training regional 
forces. SOCOM commands many language 
and culture specialists assigned to 
specialized Civil Affairs (CA) units, or 
attached to Special Forces Operational 
Detachment Alphas (ODAs).219 Culture and 
human intelligence (HUMINT) expertise is 
especially important when SOF operate in a 
predominantly tribal society, as in 
Afghanistan.220 Special Forces receive more 
advanced cultural awareness training than 
conventional forces, and are typically more 
adaptable to varied operating 
environments.221 These skills make SOF 
personnel valuable HUMINT assets when 
coupled with their knowledge of the 
strategic situation. This expertise applies 
well to the cultural situation in many areas 
of Africa, and will likely contribute 
significantly to SOCOM involvement in the 
region. 
 Additional current conflicts in Africa 
may become a hotbed for activity by U.S. 
and other nations' Special Operations 
Forces in the near future. The rebellion in 
the Republic of Mali may be a fitting 
example. Following the fall of Libyan 
dictator Moammar Gadhafi, an influx of 
arms and fighters from the Libyan Army into 
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northern Mali strengthened Tuareg 
insurgent groups in the area.222 Soldiers and 
Tuareg militias in northern Mali rebelled 
against the Malian government in the south, 
effectively splitting the country in two.223 The 
rebellion forced Malian forces out of the 
north, allowing Islamist groups to establish a 
presence there.224 
 In January 2013, after the Malian 
government requested assistance in 
retaking northern Mali, French forces 
launched Operation Serval.225 This 
intervention was an effort to aid Malian 
forces in taking back northern Mali, in order 
to prevent Islamist groups, such as AQIM, 
from establishing permanant bases of 
operation there.226 In international military 
interventions such as this, Special 
Operations are likely to be utilized in order 
to keep overall foreign military involvement 
to the smallest footprint possible. It appears 
that France has employed this tactic during 
its involvement in Mali. Reports from a 
Malian source to the Agence France-Presse 
(AFP) indicate that French Special Forces 
are training and fighting with the Malian 
army.227 There are unofficial reports of 
British228 and U.S. Special Forces training 
troops in Mali as well.229 U.S. involvement 
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has thus far been limited to logistical 
support by air, and further involvement 
would likely not be advertised by the U.S. 
government.230 Future U.S. intervention in 
Africa will probably follow a similiar model to 
the French involvement in Mali. U.S. Special 
Operations will likely have a larger role, as 
the U.S. Special Operations program is 
being emphasized more intently following 
the downsizing of overall U.S. military 
strength.231 
 As the United States draws down its 
conventional role in Afghanistan, as it has in 
Iraq, Special Operations will begin to take a 
lead role in U.S. military actions, as the 
DOD calls for smaller, more flexible 
forces.232 In recent years, the continent of 
Africa, home to many weak or failing 
nations, has attracted militant Islamist 
groups to establish a foothold on the 
continent. As the U.S. shifts its attention in 
overseas anti-terror operations away from 
Afghanistan, it appears that Africa may 
become the next significant theatre in which 
USSOCOM will need to prepare to operate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                       
malian-special-operations-soldiers/ (accessed March 
23, 2013). 
230 "Malian forces battle Tuareg rebels," News24. 
http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Malian-forces-
battle-Tuareg-rebels-20120304 (accessed March 23, 
2013). 
231 Weisgerber, "U.S. Special Ops to Grow as DoD 
Budget Shrinks." 
232 Ibid. 
35 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
 
Mary A. Doyle.………………………………………………………...….Director of Research 
Jon B. Mitchell…………………………………………………………………Executive Editor 
Dr. Charles Murphy…………………………………………………………….Faculty Advisor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Strategic Intelligence Society is a campus club at Liberty University in Lynchburg, 
Virginia. The purpose of the Strategic Intelligence Society is to prepare undergraduate 
students for employment within the Intelligence Community by encouraging critical 
thinking that leads to the analysis of current events: specifically, the ability to discern 
intelligence from information within the fields of politics, technology, transnational 
issues, economics, and military policy. This is accomplished by providing the students 
with a multitude of opportunities, which include interactive sessions with guest speakers 
from various fields within government, the intelligence community, and law enforcement, 
a variety of intelligence-related extra-curricular opportunities, and various analytical 
publications. The Strategic Informer is the publication of the Strategic Intelligence 
Society, featuring articles from distinguished faculty members within the Helms School 
of Government at Liberty University as well as selected articles from top student 
contributors concentrating on current affairs pertaining to intelligence, law enforcement, 
and national security. 
